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Note
Reclaiming Reclamation: Rule Changes Proposed
To Ensure Coal Companies Fund Mandatory
Clean-Ups
Taylor Mayhall∗
When I was a child my family would travel
Down to Western Kentucky where my parents were born
And there’s a backwards old town that’s often remembered
So many times that my memories are worn. 1

These nostalgic lyrics by folk singer John Prine may not seem
likely candidates to become the anthem of a social activist movement. Yet this 1971 song, entitled “Paradise,” 2 made famous the
large-scale impacts of strip mining, a form of surface mining that
removes seams of coal by digging out huge open pits. 3
And daddy won’t you take me back to Muhlenberg County
Down by the Green River where Paradise 4 lay
Well, I’m sorry my son, but you’re too late in asking
Mister Peabody’s coal train has hauled it away 5

∗ J.D. Candidate 2018, University of Minnesota Law School. Thank you
to everyone who provided ideas and feedback throughout the writing process,
especially Professor Bradley Karkkainen, Professor Alexandra Klass, Mr. Gregory Conrad, and Minnesota Law Review editors and staff. Copyright © 2018 by
Taylor Mayhall.
1. John Prine Lyrics, AZLYRICS, http://www.azlyrics.com/lyrics/johnprine/
paradise.html (last visited Jan. 31, 2018).
2. This song was later covered by numerous prominent artists including
Johnny Cash, John Fogerty, and Jimmy Buffett. See Artists Covering John
Prine Songs, JP SHRINE, http://www.jpshrine.org/lyrics/prineapps2.htm (last
updated Oct. 4, 2017); see also Paradise, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/
wiki/Paradise_(John_Prine_song) (last visited Jan. 31, 2018).
3. William Andrew Hustrulid, Strip Mining, ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITTANICA, https://www.britannica.com/technology/strip-mining (last visited Jan. 31,
2018).
4. While Paradise figuratively refers to a pristine, heavenly place, it literally refers to a town in Kentucky. See Jack Doyle, Paradise, 1971: John Prine,
POP HISTORY DIG (May 28, 2014), http://www.pophistorydig.com/topics/paradise1971-john-prine.
5. John Prine Lyrics, supra note 1.
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Prine wrote this song for his father, as a tribute to family trips
to Kentucky when he was a child.6 After the song’s debut, environmentalists latched on to it as illustrative of why tougher mining regulations were needed. 7
Then the coal company came with the world’s largest shovel 8
And they tortured the timber and stripped all the land
Well, they dug for their coal till the land was forsaken
Then they wrote it all down as the progress of man. 9

By touting this song and pushing hard at Congress and state
politicians, environmentalists eventually achieved their goal. 10
Congress passed the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation
Act (SMCRA) in 1977, 11 with a provision that requires coal mining companies to pay to “reclaim” the areas that have been
mined.12 In other words, Congress makes coal mining companies
fund efforts that will someday restore mined areas to a natural
state. Until recently, many companies have taken advantage of
a provision in the law that allows them to, in effect, insure them-

6. About, JOHN PRINE, http://www.johnprine.com/about (last visited Jan.
31, 2018).
7. E.g., Doyle, supra note 4 (“Prine’s song became one of the popular expressions of that struggle [to get strip mine regulations], helping to bring the
issue to a broader audience, and was also used to rally supporters.”). Environmentalists have continued to use the song as a weapon against Peabody. See
Ben Neary, Peabody Energy Still Chafes at Strip-Mining Protest Song, WASH.
TIMES (July 6, 2015), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2015/jul/6/
peabody-energy-still-chafes-at-strip-mining-protes (describing recent use of the
song to rankle Peabody in a federal lawsuit brought by environmentalists regarding a pension-related protest at a Peabody shareholder meeting).
8. For more information about the “world’s largest shovel,” named Big
Hog, see James Bruggers, Bankrupt Peabody Had “World’s Largest Shovel,”
COURIER J. (Apr. 15, 2016), http://www.courier-journal.com/story/tech/science/
watchdog-earth/2016/04/13/peabody-bankruptcy-remembering-big-hog/
82980882.
9. John Prine Lyrics, supra note 1.
10. See Doyle, supra note 4.
11. Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977, 30 U.S.C. § 1201
(2012).
12. See generally, Regulation of Surface Mining Operations: Hearings on S.
425 and S. 923 Before the S. Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 93d Cong.
(1973) (including testimony before the Senate Committees expressing both opposition to and support for a federal law regulating reclamation of surface mines
across the States). In addition to requiring active coal companies to pay for future reclamation, the law also imposes a fee on each ton of coal mined to be
deposited into the Abandoned Mine Reclamation Fund, which grants money to
reclaim mines abandoned or left inadequately restored prior to SMCRA’s passage on August 3, 1977. 30 U.S.C. §§ 1231, 1234.
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selves for the reclamation money—a process called self-bonding. 13
For forty years, coal continued to be the primary fuel for
electricity generation in the United States,14 and top coal mining
companies like Peabody, Arch Coal, and Alpha Natural Resources 15 continued to mine and eventually pay to have the land
reclaimed. 16 However, beginning in 2015, the industry began to
face serious changes. First, natural gas surpassed coal to become
the dominant fuel for America’s electric grid.17 Next, Walter Energy, Alpha Natural Resources, and several other major coal
companies declared bankruptcy, causing many to wonder who
would be next.18 The pattern of disconcerting industry changes
continued in 2016. According to the U.S. Energy Information Administration, coal production declined nationwide by seventeen
percent from 2015–2016, falling to the lowest production level
13. Self-bonding is not only permitted in nineteen states, but accounts for
a large percentage of outstanding reclamation bonds there. See infra note 53.
14. Natural Gas Expected To Surpass Coal in Mix of Fuel Used for U.S.
Power Generation in 2016, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (Mar. 16, 2016), http://
www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=25392# (showing graphically the
percentage of U.S. electricity generated from coal since the 1950s).
15. Major U.S. Coal Producers, 2015, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (2015),
https://www.eia.gov/coal/annual/pdf/table10.pdf (showing Peabody ranked
number one, Arch Coal at number two, and Alpha Natural Resources at number
four).
16. There are three stages of the reclamation process, referred to as Phases
I, II, and III. After each phase, the mining company submits evidence of reclamation to the relevant state agency. If the agency determines that reclamation
was successful for that phase, the company can apply for release of a portion of
its reclamation bond money. Before all the company’s reclamation money can
be released, Phase III must be successfully completed. That only occurs ten
years after final land seeding of an approved native seed mix consistent with
the local plant communities. This means that large areas of mined land may get
reclaimed, while the company still has not qualified for final bond release. Email from Carol Bilbrough, Program Manager, Land Quality Div., Wyo. Dep’t of
Envtl. Quality, to author (Feb. 23, 2017) (on file with author). For more information about the reclamation process, see 30 C.F.R. § 800.42 (2017); see also
OFFICE OF SURFACE MINING, U.S. DEP’T OF INTERIOR, PERMANENT PROGRAM
BOND RELEASE GUIDANCE (PHASES I, II, III) (May 8, 2009), https://www.wrcc
.osmre.gov/resources/guidanceDocuments/050809Final_BR_Guidance.pdf
(providing guidance on the release of reclamation bonds for coal mines).
17. Chris Mooney, This Huge Change in How We Get Energy Is Coming
Much Faster Than Expected, WASH. POST (Mar. 21, 2016), https://www
.washingtonpost.com/news/energy-environment/wp/2016/03/21/this-huge
-change-in-how-we-get-energy-is-coming-much-faster-than-expected.
18. Jody Xu Klein & Tim Loh, The Coal Miner “On Everybody’s List” as Next
Bankruptcy Victim, BLOOMBERG (Jan. 20, 2016), http://www.bloomberg.com/
news/articles/2016-01-21/the-coal-miner-on-everybody-s-list-as-next
-bankruptcy-victim.
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since 1978. 19 Natural gas surpassed coal as the number one
source of electricity for the entire year in 2016.20 Then Peabody
Coal and Arch Coal, the country’s two largest coal producers, declared bankruptcy. 21
After these bankruptcy announcements, environmentalists,
taxpayers, and people living in mine-dependent communities began demanding answers. 22 If a mining company has selfbonded—meaning that it has promised to pay for reclamation on
the assumption that it would be solvent at the time the cleanup
commences—what happens when the company goes bankrupt?
In March 2016, one environmental group, WildEarth Guardians,
decided to formally address this concern with the federal government by petitioning for a rulemaking to the Office of Surface
Mining Reclamation and Enforcement (OSMRE), requesting a
change in self-bonding policy under SMCRA.
This Note is about the struggle to hold self-bonded coal companies accountable for reclamation after they have declared
bankruptcy, focusing in particular on WildEarth Guardians’
March 2016 Petition for Rulemaking. Part I lays out the relevant
19. Brian Park, Coal Production Declines in 2016, with Average Coal Prices
Below Their 2015 Level, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (Jan. 9, 2017), http://www
.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=29472&utm_source=&utm_medium=
email&utm_campaign=5623 (“Low natural gas prices, warmer-than-normal
temperatures during the 2015[–2016] winter that reduced electricity demand,
the retirements of some coal-fired generators, and lower international coal demand have contributed to declining U.S. coal production.”).
20. Competition Between Coal and Natural Gas Affects Power Markets, U.S.
ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (June 16, 2017), https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/
detail.php?id=31672 (“In 2016, natural gas provided 34% of total electricity generation, surpassing coal to become the leading generation source.”).
21. Clifford Krauss, Peabody Energy, a Coal Giant, Seeks Bankruptcy Protection, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 13, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/14/
business/energy-environment/peabody-energy-coal-chapter-11-bankruptcy
-protection.html; Tracy Rucinski, Arch Coal Files for Bankruptcy, Hit by Mining
Downturn, REUTERS (Jan. 11, 2016), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-arch
-coal-restructuring-idUSKCN0UP0MR20160111.
22. In fact, the public began to ask so many questions and environmental
groups doggedly filed so many complaints that the Director of the Office of Surface Mining Reclamation and Enforcement (OSMRE) held a conference call with
reporters to express his own concerns and doubts. Benjamin Storrow, Concerned
About Self-Bonding, Top Federal Mining Regulator Wonders About Collusion,
CASPER STAR TRIB. (May 18, 2016), http://www.trib.com/business/energy/
concerned-about-self-bonding-top-federal-mining-regulator-wonders-about/
article_f5f5565a-2a8b-52e9-8d4f-c68d28f76c39.html. Then OSMRE issued its
first policy advisory since its establishment in 1977 on the restricted use of selfbonding by states. See Press Release, OSMRE, OSMRE Issues Policy Advisory
Regarding Use of Self-Bonding for Coal Mine Reclamation (Aug. 9, 2016),
https://www.osmre.gov/resources/newsroom/news/2016/080916.pdf.
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law, beginning with a description of the policy battle between
states and the federal government, and between eastern and
western states, that culminated in the passage of SMCRA.
SMCRA’s self-bonding provision then is explored in detail. Part
II contextualizes the Petition for Rulemaking by describing the
U.S. coal industry’s decline since 2011 and discussing Petitioners’ specific requests, as well as the opposing parties’ main counterarguments. Finally, Part III looks to the future of self-bonding
as a reclamation-funding tool. An examination of possible federal
agency, state agency, and legislative actions shows that there is
more than one way to approach the problem. Ultimately, this
Note argues that a combination of federal rule changes and state
agency efforts would provide the best solution to help ensure reclamation efforts occur as planned.
I. DIGGING INTO MINING LEGISLATION: LEGAL
CONTEXT OF SELF-BONDING
Coal mining is regulated under the federal Surface Mining
Control and Reclamation Act of 1977 (SMCRA).23 This Part provides an overview of SMCRA’s history, along with specific aspects of the law pertaining to self-bonding. This history illustrates the delicate balance struck between federal and state
authority that is at stake in the rulemaking petition.
A. HOW CONTENTIOUS COAL MINING LEGISLATION BECAME
LAW
Prior to SMCRA’s enactment, individual states created their
own legislation to regulate coal mining activity.24 Very little was
enforced in the way of coal mining reclamation.25 Though surface
mining accounts for environmental damage including water pollution, erosion and flooding, air pollution, destruction of fish and
wildlife habitats, and noise pollution, 26 few states undertook the
23. Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977, 30 U.S.C. § 1201
(2012).
24. John D. Edgcomb, Comment, Cooperative Federalism and Environmental Protection: The Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977,
58 TUL. L. REV. 299, 305–06 (1983) (discussing the increasing levels of state
regulation of surface mining before 1977).
25. Id. at 305 (“No state was engaged in enforcing surface mining reclamation until 1939 . . . . During the late 1940’s [sic] and early 1950’s [sic] a number
of other states passed . . . legislation, but these efforts were usually quite ‘mild’
in nature and normally contained numerous exemptions.”).
26. Id. at 303–05. For impacts of surface mining, see generally ALEXIS
BONOGOFSKY ET AL., NAT’L WILDLIFE FED’N ET AL., UNDERMINED PROMISE II
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practice of enforcing reclamation. 27 In the late 1960s, conservation groups, believing that the minimal state legislation in existence was not enough to regulate the environmental impacts of
mines, began several campaigns to strengthen states’ laws on
the subject.28 Some states responded by substantially toughening their legislation, and arguments were made by state political
figures that the federal government should not get involved at
all.29 However, entering the 1970s, Congress came to realize that
the mining industry was not policing itself. 30 In an effort to create and enforce consistent and meaningful standards, Congress
set to work on what would eventually become SMCRA.31
Developing legislation that could get through Congress
proved extremely difficult. SMCRA’s legislative history reveals
that the battle involved six years of extensive hearings, bitter
debate, and two presidential vetoes before it finally passed. 32
“The eighty-eight page bill represents an attempt to ‘strike a balance between protection of the environment and agricultural
productivity and the Nation’s need for coal as an essential source
of energy.’” 33 Ultimately, SMCRA serves several purposes: (1) it
acknowledges the nation’s interests in protecting the environment; (2) assures the nation’s coal supply as a necessary source
of energy; and (3) fills a statutory gap to regulate coal mining
and reclamation in a way that the other federal environmental
statutes in existence at that time—such as the Clean Air Act and
the Clean Water Act—did not.34
(2015) [hereinafter UNDERMINED PROMISE II], http://www.underminedpromise
.org/UnderminedPromiseII.pdf (providing the updated “status of coal surface
mine reclamation”).
27. “Disproportionate industry influence in state political circles” and the
fear of a “‘regulatory atmosphere’ which could drive off potential or existing
mine operators” contributed to inadequate state regulatory programs. Edgcomb,
supra note 24, at 307–08.
28. Id. at 306.
29. Id.; see, e.g., Surface-Mined Land Conservation and Reclamation Act,
1971 Ill. Laws 2881; KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 350.010–.990 (West 1963); Surface
Mining and Reclamation, 1967 W. Va. Acts 909.
30. Edgcomb, supra note 24, at 306.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 311–12.
33. Id. (quoting 30 U.S.C. § 1202(f ) (Supp. III 1979)).
34. KATIE M. SWEENEY & SHERRIE A. ARMSTRONG, AM. BAR ASS’N: SECTION OF ENV’T, ENERGY, & RES., COOPERATIVE FEDERALISM IN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: A GROWING ROLE FOR INDUSTRY 4 (Oct. 9, 2013), https://www
.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/events/environment_energy_resources/
2013/10/21st_fall_conference/conference_materials/17-sweeney_katie-paper
.authcheckdam.pdf.
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However, Congress understood that states must play a critical role in mining regulations. While SMCRA created the federal Office of Surface Mining Reclamation and Enforcement (OSMRE) to oversee compliance with the statute,35 Congress also
determined that “because of the diversity in terrain, climate, biologic, chemical, and other physical conditions in areas subject
to mining operations, the primary governmental responsibility
for developing, authorizing, issuing, and enforcing regulations
for surface [coal] mining and reclamation operations . . . should
rest with the States.” 36 To integrate competing federal and state
power, SMCRA established a federal-state partnership scheme.
Congress set national minimum standards for surface coal mining operations, and delegated authority to the federal agency
OSMRE to interpret those provisions and promulgate procedures for their implementation. 37 Then, states had the opportunity to submit their own statutory and regulatory regime for
coal mine operations within their jurisdiction, so long as they
met the minimum standards in SMCRA. 38 If OSMRE determined that a state’s program met the requirements, the state
obtained exclusive jurisdiction over surface coal mining and reclamation on nonfederal lands.39 In other words, the federal provisions of SMCRA became irrelevant, and OSMRE retained only
limited oversight to ensure that the state’s program is enforced.40 This federalism scheme inevitably led to tensions,
which will be discussed in Part II. With this background on how
SMCRA became law, the next Sections turn to specifics about
the requirements and enforcement of SMCRA’s self-bonding provision.
B. HOW SMCRA REQUIRES RECLAMATION BONDS
“The central requirement of SMCRA is that the regulatory
authority must approve a permit before any person may operate
35. 30 U.S.C. § 1211 (2012).
36. Id. § 1201(f ).
37. Id. § 1211(c)(1)–(2).
38. Id. § 1253.
39. Id. Twenty-four states have primacy over mining operations in their
jurisdictions. Self-Bonding Facts, OSMRE, http://www.osmre.gov/resources/
selfBonding.shtm (last visited Jan. 31, 2018).
40. SWEENEY & ARMSTRONG, supra note 34, at 4–5; cf. Bragg v. W. Va. Coal
Ass’n, 248 F.3d 275, 293–98 (4th Cir. 2001) (holding that a private citizen suit
brought in federal court alleging a violation of SMCRA was barred by the Eleventh Amendment because West Virginia had state primacy over its mining program and therefore was not implementing federal law).

1458

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[102:1451

a coal mine.” 41 A “precondition to the issuance of a mining permit
is the coal mine operator’s demonstration of financial responsibility, satisfied by posting a reclamation bond in an amount ‘sufficient to assure the completion of the reclamation plan if the
work had to be performed by the regulatory authority.’” 42 There
are three major types of reclamation bonds: corporate surety
bonds, collateral bonds, and self-bonds.43 The most important
type of reclamation bond for the purposes of this Note is the selfbond. 44
A self-bond is a legally binding corporate promise, without
separate surety or collateral, that is available only to permittees
who meet certain financial tests. 45 The allowance for self-bonds
is laid out in SMCRA at 30 U.S.C. § 1259(c): “The regulatory authority may accept the bond of the applicant itself without separate surety when the applicant demonstrates to the satisfaction
of the regulatory authority . . . a history of financial solvency and
continuous operation sufficient for authorization to self-insure
or bond such amount . . . .” 46 This provision was originally proposed in the Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources.47 The legislative history of the provision states simply,
“Subsection (c) recognizes that some applicants can satisfy the
objectives of the bond requirement through self-insurance or

41. Maureen D. Carmen & Richard Warne, SMCRA Enforcement in Bankruptcy: Regulatory Powers Revisited, 25 ENERGY & MIN. L. INST. ch. 7, 187
(2005). The regulatory authority is either OSMRE or a state agency, if OSMRE
has approved the state’s system to obtain “primacy” over coal mining activities
within its borders. Id.
42. Id. at 188 (quoting 30 U.S.C. § 1259(a)).
43. Reclamation Performance Bonds: Bonding Overview, OSMRE, https://
www.osmre.gov/resources/bonds/bondsoverview.shtm (last updated Apr. 24,
2017). A corporate surety bond is a guarantee of a permittee’s performance by
an outside surety company, made based on that company’s assessment of the
permittee’s credit rating, experience, and net worth. Id. The surety company is
promising to reclaim a mined site if the permittee fails to do so. Id. A collateral
bond is a permittee’s sacrifice of some form of collateral (such as cash; certificates of deposit; first-lien interests in real estate; letters of credit; federal, state,
or municipal bonds; and investment-grade securities) to be held by the regulatory authority until reclamation is completed. Id.
44. This Note will use “self-bond” generally to refer to self-bonds by the
mine operator, parent corporate guarantees, and nonparent corporate guarantees unless otherwise specified.
45. Self-Bonding Facts, supra note 39.
46. 30 U.S.C. § 1259(c). This provision was originally proposed in the Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources Amendments to House Bill 2.
S. REP. NO. 95-128 (1977).
47. S. REP. NO. 95-128, at 1.
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bonding.” 48 According to the Senate Committee, the purpose of
the bond was “having a fund available to accomplish reclamation.” 49
There are three entities who may qualify to guarantee a selfbond. The same term is often applied to each situation, but the
proper terminology is as follows:
A “self-bond” is guaranteed by the mine operator, usually a subsidiary of a larger parent corporation.
A “parent corporate guarantee” is guaranteed by the parent corporation of the mine operator, which is sometimes also a subsidiary of a
larger parent corporation. . . .
A “non-parent corporate guarantee” is guaranteed by an entity that
is neither the mine operator nor its direct parent . . . . [T]he guarantor
may be within the same corporate family, or may be non-affiliated. 50

The main advantage of self-bonds for operators is that they
do not tie up property, cash, or credit capacity with regulatory
authorities and financial institutions, or require the payment of
surety-bond premiums. 51 “SMCRA allows state regulatory authorities to accept self-bonds as a matter of discretion; it does not
require them to do so.” 52 However, nineteen states allow selfbonding, and ten of those states actually have self-bonded surface mining permits issued. 53 It may be optional under the statute, but it is a reality on the ground. This means that SMCRA’s
48. Id. at 78.
49. Id. Interestingly, the Interstate Mining Compact Commission (IMCC),
a current opponent of the Petition for Rulemaking, met in Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, in early 1977, to read through the proposed Senate Amendments to
House Bill 2 and make suggestions to be shared with Congress. Surface Mining
Control and Reclamation Act of 1977: Hearings on S.7 Before the Subcomm. on
Public Lands and Res. of the S. Comm. on Energy and Nat. Res., 95th Cong. 174
(1977). The IMCC specifically suggested a “[s]trengthening amendment to disallow ‘self insuring.’” Id. at 1190. Its rationale was that “[n]o history of solvency
assures future solvency nor does self-bonding make funds readily accessible to
the regulatory authority to carry out reclamation plans, but it must litigate with
the company to acquire the funds.” Id.
50. UNDERMINED PROMISE II, supra note 26, at 12.
51. Id. at 11–12.
52. OSMRE, Policy Advisory: Self-Bonding 3 (Aug. 5, 2016), https://www
.osmre.gov/resources/bonds/DirPolicyAdvisory-SelfBond.pdf [hereinafter OSMRE, Policy Advisory].
53. Self-Bonding Facts, supra note 39. Self-bonding is not just present in
those states, but accounts for a huge percentage of those states’ outstanding
reclamation bonding. For example, in 2014, self-bonding accounted for seventy
percent ($338,439,944) of outstanding reclamation bonds in New Mexico and
sixty-three percent ($2,138,201,079) in Wyoming. Self-Bonding Survey, INTERSTATE MINING COMPACT COMM’N 7–9 (2014), http://imcc.isa.us/Self%20Bonding
%20Survey.pdf.
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self-bonding provision may inadvertently create reclamation-enforcement problems in ten states if the company guaranteeing
the self-bond does not have sufficient resources for reclamation
when mining is complete. Having identified self-bonds as a prevalent type of reclamation bond, the next Section turns to the federal requirements for a company who wishes to use self-bonds.
C. HOW OSMRE REGULATES SELF-BONDS
Pursuant to its duty to interpret and implement SMCRA’s
minimum standards for surface coal mining operations, OSMRE
has promulgated rules governing self-bonding over the years.
The most stringent rules were enacted in 1979, but a petition for
rulemaking and several lawsuits initiated by industry and public interest groups led OSMRE to revise the rules in 1983. 54
These 1983 rules have remained substantially the same to this
day, with the inclusion of a 1988 amendment allowing third parties to guarantee a self-bond. 55 OSMRE’s regulations governing
self-bonding are listed at 30 C.F.R. § 800.23. They describe the
minimum requirements a mining company must demonstrate to
qualify for a self-bond.56
According to 30 C.F.R. § 800.23(b), a state regulatory authority may accept a self-bond from an applicant for a permit if
all of the following conditions are met by the applicant or its parent corporation guarantor: First, “[t]he applicant has been in
continuous operation as a business entity for a period of not less
than five years.” 57 Second, the applicant must submit financial
information in sufficient detail to show that the applicant: (1)
“has a current rating for its most recent bond issuance of ‘A’ or
54. See Bond and Insurance Requirements for Surface Coal Mining and
Reclamation Operations, 48 Fed. Reg. 32,932 (July 19, 1983). The 1979 rules as
originally proposed would have required an applicant for self-bonding to demonstrate compliance with SMCRA over a ten-year period and required that a mortgage or security interest in property at least equal to the bonded liability be
granted to the regulatory authority. L. Thomas Galloway & Thomas J. Fitzgerald, The Bonding Program Under the 1977 Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act: Chaos in the Coalfields, 89 W. VA. L. REV. 675, 686 (1987).
55. See Bond and Insurance Requirements for Surface Coal Mining and
Reclamation Operations Under Regulatory Programs, 53 Fed. Reg. 997 (Jan.
14, 1988).
56. Since federal regulations set the minimum requirements for mining operations, states with approved programs may set more stringent requirements
in their own regulations. Carmen & Warne, supra note 41, at 187.
57. 30 C.F.R. § 800.23(b)(2) (2017). “Continuous operation” is defined as an
entity that conducted business over a period of five years immediately preceding
the time of application. Id.
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higher as issued by either Moody’s Investor Service or Standard
and Poor’s Corporation”; (2) “has a tangible net worth of at least
$10 million, a ratio of total liabilities to net worth of 2.5 times or
less, and a ratio of current assets to current liabilities of 1.2
times or greater”; or (3) “[t]he applicant’s fixed assets in the
United States total at least $20 million, and the applicant has a
ratio of total liabilities to net worth of 2.5 times or less, and a
ratio of current assets to current liabilities of 1.2 times or
greater.” 58 Third, the “total amount of the outstanding and proposed self-bonds of the applicant for surface coal mining and reclamation operations must not exceed 25 percent of the applicant’s tangible net worth in the United States.” 59 Finally, the
last condition is more of a warning: the state regulatory authority may require self-bonded applicants to submit an update of
the aforementioned information within ninety days after the
close of each fiscal year.60
If a permittee intends to use a “parent corporate guarantee,”
the conditions apply to the parent corporation as if it were the
applicant. 61 If a permittee intends to use a “non-parent corporate
guarantee,” the conditions apply to both the applicant and the
corporate guarantor.62 While this may seem like a thorough
check into the financial history of each applicant and guarantor,
the conditions overlook several key factors, particularly related
to corporate structuring, that may create reclamation-enforcement problems and recently led to public outcry from environmental groups.
II. BURIED IN DEBT: HOW A MASSIVE DECLINE IN THE
COAL INDUSTRY LED TO A PETITION FOR RULEMAKING
The self-bonding provision in SMCRA works well when a
mining company is solvent. However, if market demand for coal
wanes and mining companies begin to struggle financially, selfbonding becomes a risky way to finance reclamation. Section A
describes how such a situation played out over the last eight
years, resulting in numerous mining-company bankruptcies and
58. Id. § 800.23(b)(3).
59. Id. § 800.23(d).
60. Id. § 800.23(f ).
61. Id. § 800.23(c)(1).
62. Id. § 800.23(c)(2). Note, however, that the § 800.23(b)(3) financial requirements only apply to the guarantor in the case of a non-parent corporate
guarantee, unless the regulatory authority specifically requests the (b)(3) financial information from the applicant. Id.
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finally WildEarth Guardians’ Petition for Rulemaking. Section
B explains how problematic assumptions implicit in the selfbonding regulations have been revealed as coal companies enter
bankruptcy. Section C identifies petitioners’ main concerns and
describes the groups who commented in favor of the rulemaking.
Finally, Section D looks at the counterarguments made by
groups who opposed the rulemaking. Together, these Sections
contain the context necessary to meaningfully address the future
of self-bonding in the coal industry.
A. BACKGROUND ON RECENT COAL MINING BANKRUPTCIES
Leading up to 2011, coal companies entered large acquisition deals, financed heavily with debt, to capitalize on a temporary rise in coal price. 63 Soon after, however, cheap natural gas
made available by hydraulic fracking technologies undercut domestic thermal coal markets, and the coal companies began to
flounder. 64 Over a period of eight months from 2015 to early
2016, four of the largest U.S. coal mine operators filed for Chapter 11 protection under the U.S. Bankruptcy Code. 65 Then in
April 2016, Peabody Energy, the world’s largest privately-owned
coal company, announced that it had filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy, following a significant downturn in the coal market that
left the company saddled with debt. 66 Peabody’s Chapter 11 filing was the latest in a series of coal industry bankruptcies that
affected more than fifty companies since 2012; producers accounting for forty-five percent of coal output have filed for bankruptcy in the current industry downturn, according to 2014 U.S.
government figures. 67 In 2017, as coal production costs continue
to rise due to economic and geologic factors while global markets
and domestic competition for electricity generation push coal

63. UNDERMINED PROMISE II, supra note 26, at 13; see also Mayur Sontakke, Should You Expect Big U.S. Coal Mergers and Acquisitions Soon?, MKT.
REALIST (Dec. 3, 2014), http://www.marketrealist.com/2014/12/understanding
-consolidation-us-coal-industry (describing the acquisition deals in general).
64. See Mooney, supra note 17 (describing the effect of fracking technologies on coal markets).
65. These companies were Arch Coal, Alpha Natural Resources, Patriot
Coal, and Walter Energy. See Klein & Loh, supra note 18 (describing the companies).
66. Bryan Dewan, The World’s Largest Private Coal Company Just Filed
for Bankruptcy, THINKPROGRESS (Apr. 13, 2016), https://thinkprogress.org/the
-worlds-largest-private-coal-company-just-filed-for-bankruptcy-32946551e2d5.
67. Id.
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prices down, the pressures on coal producers show no sign of relenting.68 Although President Trump promised to deliver muchneeded regulatory and financial support to the coal industry during the 2016 campaign season, 69 it seems unlikely that the coal
market itself will improve in the long term. 70 Bankruptcy proceedings are the new reality for coal producers, and have recently illuminated some fundamental problems with the practice
of self-bonding.
B. ASSUMPTIONS IN SELF-BONDING RULES COME TO LIGHT
ONCE BANKRUPTCY OCCURS
When a mining company or its guarantor declares bankruptcy, the full amount of its self-bonds cannot be guaranteed.
But, as interpreted by OSMRE and by state regulatory authorities, the regulations set forth at 30 C.F.R. § 800.23 may actually

68. UNDERMINED PROMISE II, supra note 26, at 13; see also Barack Obama,
The Irreversible Momentum of Clean Energy, SCIENCE (Jan. 9, 2017), http://
science.sciencemag.org/content/early/2017/01/06/science.aam6284.full (noting
the shift to lower-emitting natural gas). But see Elias Johnson, U.S. Coal Production and Coal-Fired Electricity Generation Expected To Rise in Near Term,
U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (Feb. 8, 2017), https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/
detail.php?id=29872 (“In 2017 and 2018, as natural gas prices are expected to
increase, coal is expected to regain some share of the electricity generation mix,
and coal production is expected to increase slightly.”).
69. See, e.g., Donald Trump, Trump Outlines Plan for American Energy Renaissance, VOTE SMART (Sept. 22, 2016), https://votesmart.org/public
-statement/1135044/trump-outlines-plan-for-american-energy-renaissance#
.WdxEtkyZPGI (“[Our energy policy] will end the war on coal. I will rescind the
coal mining lease moratorium, the excessive Interior Department stream rule,
and conduct a top-down review of all anti-coal regulations issued by the Obama
Administration.”). But see Justin Worland, Donald Trump Says He’ll Bring
Back Coal. Here’s Why He Can’t, TIME (Nov. 14, 2016), http://www.time.com/
4570070/donald-trump-coal-jobs (describing why this promise is unlikely to be
upheld); Clifford Krauss & Michael Corkery, A Bleak Outlook for Trump’s Promises to Coal Miners, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 19, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/
11/20/business/energy-environment/a-bleak-outlook-for-trumps-promises-to
-coal-miners.html (describing the challenges the then president-elect would face
in order to deliver on his promises).
70. Yet coal companies remained hopeful as coal production increased
slightly at the end of 2016. See Heather Richards, Despite Dark Times, Coal
Ends 2016 on a More Positive Note, CASPER STAR TRIB. (Dec. 27, 2016), https://
www.trib.com/business/energy/despite-dark-times-coal-ends-on-a-more
-positive-note/article_823f6e71-380d-537a-a14e-897c48b53453.html (“In the afterglow of the holiday season, following an increase in coal production at the
end of the year, an industry knocked to its knees in 2016 is showing budding
optimism.”).

1464

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[102:1451

allow companies to self-bond even where they do not have a history of financial solvency.71 To the extent the rules allow for nonparent corporate guarantees, they do not explicitly require regulatory authorities to account for the financial viability of the
non-parent’s parent corporation. 72 For example, OSMRE stated
in 2014:
While it may be true that both Peabody Energy Company and Arch
Coal, Inc. do not meet the requirements for self-bonding, they are not
the guarantors for their mines’ self-bonds. There are subsidiary companies in both instances that do meet the requirements for self-bonds,
and are the guarantors. This practice is in full compliance with Federal
and State laws. 73

However, this statement assumes that an insolvent subsidiary
is not a reflection of its parent companies. In reality, this has
proved to be a false assumption. When Arch Coal filed for bankruptcy on January 11, 2016, the company’s subsidiary, Arch
Western Resources, also filed for bankruptcy. 74 When Peabody
Energy filed for bankruptcy on April 13, 2016, the company’s
subsidiary, Peabody Investments Corporation, also filed for
bankruptcy. 75 Put simply, recent coal mining bankruptcies have
shown that financial troubles for a larger umbrella company will
often impact the subsidiaries under that umbrella too.
In a bankruptcy situation, it is doubtful that a company will
agree to produce some other form of reclamation bond, such as
surety or collateral, without a great deal of political pressure,
since producing another form of bond would make the company’s
bankruptcy position worse. “[O]btaining a third-party surety
bond or posting additional collateral to guarantee reclamation ‘if
achievable at all, could entail significant expense and directly
impact the Debtors’ liquidity position.’” 76 A U.S. Bankruptcy
71. WildEarth Guardians, Petition for the Amendment of a Rule to the Office of Surface Mining Reclamation and Enforcement 1 (Mar. 3, 2016) [hereinafter Petition for Rulemaking].
72. Id. at 7. The Petition for Rulemaking points out that the rules have
been interpreted to not require regulatory authorities to consider the fact that
the non-parent corporation’s assets may be pledged to a parent corporation’s
debt, or to consider other factors that may link the financial health of a subsidiary with a parent company. Id.
73. Id. at 5 (quoting Exhibit 5, OSMRE Self-Bonding Fact Sheet).
74. Id. at 6.
75. Peabody Investments Corp., Docket No. 4:16-bk-42549 (Bankr. E.D.
Mo. Apr. 13, 2016); Company Overview of Peabody Investments Corp., BLOOMBERG, http://www.bloomberg.com/research/stocks/private/snapshot
.asp?privcapId=29868771 (last visited Jan. 31, 2018).
76. Petition for Rulemaking, supra note 71, at 6 n.5 (attributing a quotation
to Exhibit 5 at 9, but actually quoting Exhibit 6, Notice of the Debtors’ Motion
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Court allowed at least one company in this situation (Arch Coal)
to continue self-bonding for a time despite bankruptcy. 77 As
these bankruptcy proceedings have revealed problematic assumptions implicit within the self-bonding regulations, citizens
have become increasingly concerned and pushed for change,
demonstrated by the 2016 Petition for Rulemaking.
C. WHAT THE PETITIONERS WANT
On March 3, 2016, WildEarth Guardians, a nonprofit conservation advocacy organization headquartered in New Mexico,
filed a petition for rulemaking with OSMRE. 78 Pursuant to
30 U.S.C. § 1211(g), “any person may petition the [OSMRE] Director to initiate a proceeding for the issuance, amendment, or
repeal of a rule under this chapter.” 79 WildEarth Guardians
asked OSMRE to amend self-bonding regulations at 30 C.F.R.
§ 800.23 to ensure that companies with a history of financial insolvency are not allowed to self-bond coal mining operations. 80
WildEarth Guardians is specifically concerned about non-parent
corporate guarantees, because the current rules do not contemplate that subsidiary corporations may be insolvent by virtue of
the insolvency of their parent or ultimate parent corporations. 81
If U.S. Bankruptcy Courts allow bankrupt companies to continue self-bonding—as has been done in the past 82—the current
rules present a very significant and real risk that some or all of
the company’s reclamation obligations will eventually fall upon
taxpayers; indeed, as currently applied, the rules do not achieve
the objectives and purposes of SMCRA’s bonding requirements.83
1. Proposed Rule Changes
WildEarth Guardians attached redlined suggestions for new

Pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule 9019, for Entry of a Stipulation and Order Concerning Reclamation Bonding of Their Surface Coal Mining Operations in Wyoming at 9, In re Arch Coal Inc., No. 16-40120-705 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. Feb. 9,
2016)).
77. Id. at 6.
78. Id. at 1.
79. 30 U.S.C. § 1211(g) (2012).
80. Petition for Rulemaking, supra note 71, at cover letter.
81. Id. at 5.
82. See id. at 6 (describing this occurrence with Arch Coal and their filings
with the U.S. Bankruptcy Court in the Eastern District of Missouri).
83. Id.
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rule language to its Petition for Rulemaking, 84 but emphasized
that it would like to see OSMRE use a public rulemaking process
to determine the final rule language.85 The suggested rule
mainly focuses on adding provisions that would account for various forms of guarantors that are not currently considered in the
rule. Specifically, WildEarth Guardians proposed the addition of
a definition for “ultimate parent corporation” at 30 C.F.R.
§ 800.23(a),86 and a provision regarding the need for regulatory
authorities to account for the financial status of the ultimate
parent corporation(s) of any corporate or non-parent corporate
guarantors when assessing total self-bonding, net worth, and
bankruptcy status. 87 More controversially, WildEarth Guardians wants OSMRE to add a paragraph that forbids applicants,
including parent corporations, with a history of bankruptcy in
the last five years from self-bonding. 88 If a permitted company
files for bankruptcy, WildEarth Guardians wants the rules to
trigger a duty upon the permittee to secure an alternate bond or
be required to cease mining operations. 89
2. Comments in Favor of Petitioners’ Proposed Rule
OSMRE sought comments on whether it should consider or
deny changes to SMCRA, especially those proposed by
WildEarth. 90 One hundred seventeen thousand (117,000) comments were received. 91 About ninety-nine percent of the comments were in favor of the rulemaking, while less than one percent (thirteen unique comments) were opposed.92 Comments in
84. See id. at 8–11 (discussing the petitioned-for amendment rule).
85. Id. at 8.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 10–11.
88. Id. at 8–9.
89. Id. at 11.
90. Notice of Availability of Petition To Initiate Rulemaking and Request
for Comments on the Petition, 81 Fed. Reg. 98 (published May 20, 2016) (to be
codified at 30 C.F.R. pt. 800).
91. WEG Petition for Rulemaking – Self-Bonding Docket Folder Summary
(last updated Sept. 7, 2016), https://www.regulations.gov/docket?D=OSM-2016
-0006.
92. Decision on Petition for Rulemaking, 81 Fed. Reg. 173, at 61,613 (published Sept. 7, 2016) (to be codified at 30 C.F.R. pt. 800). While OSMRE states
that fourteen unique comments were opposed to the rulemaking, it included one
neutral comment in that count. This neutral comment was submitted by the
Surety & Fidelity Association of America, which is a nonprofit trade association
of companies that write most of the nation’s surety and fidelity bonds. This comment essentially explains how a surety operates under SMCRA. See Sur. & Fid.
Ass’n of Am., Comment on Petition for Rulemaking (July 6, 2016), https://www
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favor of the proposed rule mainly stemmed from environmental
groups; Alliance for Appalachia, Conservation Law Center, Environmental Law and Policy Center, Natural Resources Defense
Council, and the national Sierra Club as well as the Illinois
Chapter of Sierra Club were among the petitioners’ proponents. 93 However, many individuals wrote in as well.94 Mainly,
these comments contained generic language that had been copied and pasted from the environmental groups’ websites. The
New York University Institute for Policy Integrity wrote in to
suggest some of its own policy changes.95 Taxpayers for Common
Sense, a “nonpartisan budget watchdog” organization located in
the District of Columbia, wrote in to support the rule in defense
of taxpayers who, they argued, should not have to clean up after
the mining industry. 96 Commenters in favor of the rulemaking
all agreed that the federal government should intervene in selfbonding practices.
D. WHAT THE PARTIES OPPOSING THE RULEMAKING WANT
The thirteen unique comments opposing the rulemaking
came from mining companies and state governments in states
with significant mining activity. The mining and related electric
companies were Edison Electric Institute; Luminant Generation
Company; Murray Energy Corporation; National Mining Association; Peabody Energy; Tri-State Generation and Transmission
Association, Inc.; the Virginia Coal and Energy Alliance; and the
.regulations.gov/document?D=OSM-2016-0006-0042.
93. See All. for Appalachia, Comment on Petition for Rulemaking (July 21,
2016), https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=OSM-2016-0006-0061; Conservation Law Ctr., Comment on Petition for Rulemaking (July 11, 2016),
https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=OSM-2016-0006-0044; Envtl. Law &
Policy Ctr., Comment on Petition for Rulemaking (July 20, 2016),
https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=OSM-2016-0006-0054; Sierra Club,
Comment on Petition for Rulemaking (July 20, 2016), https://www.regulations
.gov/document?D=OSM-2016-0006-0050; Sierra Club – Ill. Chapter, Comment
on Petition for Rulemaking (July 19, 2016), https://www.regulations.gov/
document?D=OSM-2016-0006-0070.
94. See, e.g., Chloe B., Comment on Petition for Rulemaking (July 19, 2016),
https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=OSM-2016-0006-0069; Caleb Laieski, Comment on Petition for Rulemaking (June 29, 2016), https://www
.regulations.gov/document?D=OSM-2016-0006-0039.
95. See NYU School of Law Inst. for Policy Integrity, Comment on Petition
for Rulemaking (July 20, 2016), https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=
OSM-2016-0006-0062.
96. See Taxpayers for Common Sense, Comment on Petition for Rulemaking (July 20, 2016), https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=OSM-2016-0006
-0057.
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Wyoming Mining Association. 97 The state government groups
were the Interstate Mining Compact Commission; the Indiana
Department of Natural Resources; the Railroad Commission of
Texas; the State of Wyoming (represented by Governor Matthew
Mead); and the Wyoming Department of Environmental Quality. 98 All of these comments voiced the same two main concerns:
(1) the proposed rule does not properly account for SMCRA’s
state primacy/federal oversight scheme, and (2) the proposed
rule illegally discriminates against bankrupt companies.
1. State Primacy Is an Integral Part of SMCRA That Cannot
Be Ignored
As explained in Part I.A., SMCRA gives states exclusive authority to regulate surface mining once they have an approved
program, while OSMRE simply plays the role of overseer with
limited supervisory authority. 99 One of the primary reasons why
Congress chose this approach is the wide variation in geological

97. See Edison Elec. Inst., Comment on Petition for Rulemaking (July 15,
2016), https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=OSM-2016-0006-0046; Luminant Generation, Comment on Petition for Rulemaking (July 20, 2016),
https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=OSM-2016-0006-0065; Murray Energy, Comment on Petition for Rulemaking (July 20, 2016), https://www
.regulations.gov/document?D=OSM-2016-0006-0058; Nat’l Mining Ass’n, Comment on Petition for Rulemaking (July 20, 2016), https://www.regulations
.gov/document?D=OSM-2016-0006-0052; Peabody Energy, Comment on Petition for Rulemaking (July 20, 2016), https://www.regulations.gov/
document?D=OSM-2016-0006-0059; Tri-State Generation & Transmission
Ass’n, Comment on Petition for Rulemaking (July 20, 2016), https://www
.regulations.gov/document?D=OSM-2016-0006-0060; Va. Coal & Energy All.,
Comment on Petition for Rulemaking (July 20, 2016), https://www.regulations
.gov/document?D=OSM-2016-0006-0051; Wyo. Mining Ass’n, Comment on Petition for Rulemaking (July 20, 2016), https://www.regulations.gov/
document?D=OSM-2016-0006-0047.
98. See Interstate Mining Compact Comm’n, Comment on Petition for Rulemaking (June 15, 2016), https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=OSM
-2016-0006-0022; Ind. DNR, Comment on Petition for Rulemaking (June 23,
2016), https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=OSM-2016-0006-0040; R.R.
Comm’n of Tex., Comment on Petition for Rulemaking (July 8, 2016), https://
www.regulations.gov/document?D=OSM-2016-0006-0043; State of Wyo., Comment on Petition for Rulemaking (July 20, 2016), https://www.regulations.gov/
document?D=OSM-2016-0006-0068; Wyo. Dept. of Envtl. Quality, Comment on
Petition for Rulemaking (July 19, 2016), https://www.regulations.gov/
document?D=OSM-2016-0006-0048.
99. SWEENEY & ARMSTRONG, supra note 34, at 2. OSMRE steps in only if a
state fails to obtain federal approval to administer its own program or fails to
administer its program in accordance with the requirements of the Act.
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and ecological conditions under which surface mining is conducted.100 State agencies inherently have more familiarity with
the specific mining problems within their jurisdiction. For example, agencies in the southeast will understand the steep slope
mining of the Appalachian Mountains, while agencies in the arid
west will be best equipped to deal with relatively level surface
mining.101 However, the state-federal governance divide in the
statute creates a politically charged atmosphere. SMCRA regulates private coal companies that have survived difficult economic times by merging to create much larger, more powerful
companies.102 These new behemoths are potent political forces
at the state and national levels. 103
These same companies wrote in to complain that WildEarth
Guardians “fail[ed] to recognize the benefits of local regulation
that SMRCA was founded upon” by its proposal of nationwide
fixed standards. 104 One company lamented that the proposed
rule changes eliminate any state discretion in the implementation of the bonding requirements, “in contravention of this cooperative approach.” 105 In defense of state expertise, several commenters argued that “[s]tate regulatory programs have over 30
years of front line regulatory experience with coal mine bonding,” putting them “in the best position to determine whether
and to what extent adjustments are needed.” 106 Furthermore,
the state regulatory authorities are the parties that will be most
affected by any OSMRE actions taken with respect to financial
assurance requirements.107 Overwhelmingly, the opposing comments urge OSMRE to reject WildEarth Guardians’ petition, and
instead work directly with state regulatory authorities to “understand the dimensions of the issues at stake and work toward
the best possible solution for OSMRE, the States, and the public
at large.”108
100. Edgcomb, supra note 24, at 312–13.
101. Id.
102. DENISE SCHEBERLE, FEDERALISM AND ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 154
(2004).
103. Id. Scheberle uses one of the commenters on the Petition for Rulemaking as an example: “When the National Mining Association speaks, politicians
listen.” Id.
104. Wyo. Dept. of Envtl. Quality, supra note 98, at 3.
105. Edison Elec. Inst., supra note 97, at 5.
106. Ind. DNR, supra note 98, at 2; see also Interstate Mining Compact
Comm’n, supra note 98; Nat’l Mining Ass’n, supra note 97, at 4 (remarking that
states are best poised to evaluate and modify their programs moving forward).
107. Wyo. Dept. of Envtl. Quality, supra note 98, at 1.
108. Id. at 2.
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On the other hand, environmental groups are nervous to
support a cooperative plan between OSMRE and the states because, in the past, SMCRA’s deference to states has allowed
them to create lax, unenforced programs. In 2007, Undermined
Promise, the joint report on reclamation created by the National
Resources Defense Council, National Wildlife Federation, and
Western Organization of Resource Councils, reported that
“in all, [OSMRE] has done less than 3 percent of the number of inspections the states have done each year;” for 2006 to 2013, this percentage
remains the same. At 2.75% of the total number of state inspections,
the number of federal site visits continues to be low despite increases
in the total amount of acreage disturbed by mining in the five states.109

This may not be a reason for concern, but environmental groups
worry that state inspectors are too accommodating to industry,
as shown by two surveys conducted in 1995 and 2002 in which
responses indicated that state surface mining inspectors were
more likely to embrace an accommodative orientation toward
coal operators.110 In the same surveys, more than two-thirds of
state officials strongly disagreed with the necessity of OSMRE
oversight.111 The tension between federal and state oversight of
mining is palpable in the comments for those opposing the Petition for Rulemaking. 112
2. Discrimination Against Bankrupt Companies Is Illogical
and Illegal
Opponents of the Petition for Rulemaking emphasized that,
contrary to the image often conjured by the word “bankruptcy,”
not all bankruptcies result in a company’s liquidation. There are
six types of bankruptcy under the Bankruptcy Code, usually la-

109. UNDERMINED PROMISE II, supra note 26, at 36 (internal citation omitted).
110. SCHEBERLE, supra note 102, at 182 (referring to surveys sent to state
surface mining officials in twenty-four coal-producing states, along with eighteen phone interviews which complemented the survey data).
111. Id. at 185.
112. See, e.g., State of Wyo., supra note 98, at 2 (“ The OSMRE should allow
time for [state] efforts to move forward. To do otherwise threatens the economies
and livelihoods of thousands across the nation and in Wyoming.”).
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belled by the titles of the chapters under which they are categorized. 113 The coal mining companies that have declared bankruptcy did so under Chapter 11, 114 which is also known as the
“reorganization” chapter. 115 This type of bankruptcy is generally
“used by commercial enterprises that desire to continue operating a business and repay creditors concurrently through a courtapproved plan of reorganization.” 116 Importantly, Chapter 11 restructuring does not imply either insolvency or the future failure
of a company, as the National Mining Association pointed out in
its comment to the Petition for Rulemaking. 117 Furthermore, the
National Mining Association and other industry commenters argue that just because a company has declared bankruptcy does
not mean that it will be unable to provide for the reclamation
needs; in fact, reclamation can be worked into the bankruptcy
proceedings. 118
More significantly, the Bankruptcy Code prohibits discrimination based on bankruptcy status. Under § 525 of the Code, a
debtor is expressly protected against discriminatory treatment
by a governmental unit based solely on a bankruptcy filing, regardless of whether the bankruptcy filing occurs before or during
the case or proceeding. 119
The U.S. Supreme Court and other federal courts have routinely held
that actions or inactions by governmental agencies that would not have
occurred but for the bankruptcy of a debtor or former debtor are prohibited by Section 525(a), and that such prohibition applies regardless

113. See Process – Bankruptcy Basics, U.S. COURTS, http://www.uscourts
.gov/services-forms/bankruptcy/bankruptcy-basics/process-bankruptcy-basics
(last visited Jan. 31, 2018) (providing an overview and discussion of the six types
of bankruptcy cases).
114. See, e.g., OSMRE, Policy Advisory, supra note 52, at 2 (noting that in
the past few months, three of the largest coal companies have filed for Chapter
11 bankruptcy).
115. Process – Bankruptcy Basics, supra note 113.
116. Id.
117. Nat’l Mining Ass’n, supra note 97, at 6–7.
118. E.g., id. at 5. The same comment also points out: “Many of the operators
cited in WEG’s petition as alleged candidates for ineligibility to self-bond lead
the country in reclamation success and routinely win reclamation awards from
OSM for outstanding reclamation achievements.” Id. at 3.
119. 11 U.S.C. § 525 (2012). The statute specifically says: “[A] governmental
unit may not deny, revoke, suspend, or refuse to renew a license, permit, charter, franchise, or other similar grant to, condition such a grant to, discriminate
with respect to such a grant against, deny employment to, terminate the employment of, or discriminate with respect to employment against, a person that
is or has been a debtor under this title or a bankrupt or a debtor under the
Bankruptcy Act.” Id. § 525(a).
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of whether the governmental agency’s action or inaction was motivated
by a desire to enforce its regulatory mandate. 120

Since this type of illegal discrimination seems to be precisely the
solution proposed by petitioners, opponents of the rulemaking
used this Bankruptcy Code violation argument as their strongest reason for why OSMRE should not grant WildEarth Guardians’ petition. While there are evidently problems with the selfbonding rules as they currently operate, those opposing the rulemaking raised convincing legal arguments based on the language of SMCRA and the U.S. Bankruptcy Code which must be
considered in the search for a solution going forward.
III. REDEMPTION IN COAL COUNTRY: THE FUTURE OF
SELF-BONDED RECLAMATION
As the rulemaking process makes clear, efforts to hold selfbonded mining companies accountable for reclamation implicate
long-standing tensions between environmental groups, taxpayers, and industry, as well as divisions between eastern and western states, and federal and state agencies. One affected group
that has not been explored in-depth in this Note deserves mentioning: the communities dependent on mining jobs. These communities, while sympathetic to the industry, also reveal the need
to change self-bonding regulations in the future. As discussed in
Part I.A., unreclaimed mines are known to create adverse environmental impacts, and mitigation of such damage served as a
motivating factor for the initial passage of SMCRA. 121
However, there is more than merely environmental loss if a
coal mining company cannot afford to reclaim its land or moves
to a new location. People, families, and entire towns dependent
on those coal jobs are left behind. Between 2008 and 2012, the
national coal industry lost about 50,000 jobs. 122 Many thousands
more have been lost since then, and the numbers continue to decline. 123 Particularly in states like Kentucky and West Virginia,
120. Luminant Generation, supra note 97, at 3 (citing F.C.C. v. NextWave
Pers. Commc’ns Inc., 537 U.S. 293 (2003); Hillsborough Cty. v. Automated Med.
Labs., Inc., 471 U.S. 707 (1985); Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637 (1971); In re
Ray, 355 B.R. 253 (Bankr. D. Or. 2006)).
121. See supra Part I.A.
122. Chris Mooney, Study: Coal Industry Lost Nearly 50,000 Jobs in Just
Five Years, WASH. POST (Apr. 1, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/
energy-environment/wp/2015/04/01/the-decline-in-coal-jobs-in-one-chart/
?utm_term=.7f07e5571da1.
123. See generally, ANNUAL COAL REPORT: HIGHLIGHTS FOR 2015, U.S. ENERGY & INFO. ADMIN. (Nov. 3, 2016), http://www.eia.gov/coal/annual (providing
information on the coal industry in the United States, including the number of
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people have been facing the decision to either leave their homes,
if they can afford it, or stay and reinvent new careers for themselves. 124 For the sake of these people, ensuring continuous reclamation is an urgent goal. At the very least, reclamation restores some of the aesthetic beauty of these people’s homeland—
the loss of which John Prine mourned in Paradise. At best, reclamation may be the key to creating new jobs. 125 Section A discusses changes that should be made at the federal agency level.
Section B discusses changes that are already underway and
should continue at the state agency level. Section C notes that
efforts at the legislative level may serve a backup function, in
the event that the rulemaking does not occur or does not adequately address the problems currently presented by self-bonding. Overall, this Part looks to the future of self-bonding and offers recommendations to safeguard reclamation in a way that

mines, employment, and consumption of coal); Andrew Follett, Obama Kept His
Promise, 83,000 Coal Jobs Lost and 400 Mines Shuttered, DAILY CALLER (Sept.
5, 2016), http://www.dailycaller.com/2016/09/05/obama-kept-his-promise-83000
-coal-jobs-lost-and-400-mines-shuttered (describing job loss in the coal industry
during the Obama Administration); Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Beyond Coal: Imagining Appalachia’s Future, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 17, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/
2016/08/18/us/beyond-coal-imagining-appalachias-future.html (profiling how
towns in Kentucky are trying to recover from the loss of jobs in the coal mining
industry).
124. For more information, pictures, and interviews about the impact of the
coal industry’s decline in Appalachia, see the documentary series produced by
AJ+ and published on YouTube. AJ+, The Unheard Story of Appalachia’s Coal,
Part 1, YOUTUBE (Feb. 2, 2017), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=
1VBYsEGpLDI. Part 2 of the series describes how some people were unable to
leave Kentucky after the decline of coal jobs because they could not afford it,
while at the same time population data shows that (1) about 1100 people have
been leaving eastern Kentucky every year since, and (2) the death rate is now
higher than the birth rate. AJ+, How Coal’s Decline Devastated Appalachia,
Part 2, YOUTUBE (Feb. 3, 2017), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=
UJxCqHoUAT8.
125. For example, a bipartisan bill called the RECLAIM Act was introduced
in Congress in 2016 and again in 2017. See Revitalizing the Economy of Coal
Communities by Leveraging Local Activities and Investing More (RECLAIM)
Act of 2016, H.R. 4456, 114th Cong. (2016); RECLAIM Act of 2017, H.R. 1731,
115th Cong. (2017). It seeks to amend SMCRA to make certain funds available
for the Department of Interior to distribute to states that have suffered recent
declines in mining jobs. H.R. 1731 – RECLAIM Act of 2017, CONGRESS.GOV
(Mar. 27, 2017), https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/house-bill/1731
(providing a brief summary of the bill and its purposes). Essentially, the bill
would put former miners to work reclaiming those same mines. Id.; see also RECLAIM Act: Creating Jobs and Opportunities Out of Abandoned Mines, APPALACHIAN CITIZENS’ LAW CTR., http://www.powerplusplan.org/reclaim-act (last
visited Jan. 31, 2018).
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will appease environmental groups, bring solace to coal communities that have been left behind, and collaborate with mining
companies.
A. THE PETITION FOR RULEMAKING SHOULD BE ADDRESSED AT
THE FEDERAL AGENCY LEVEL
On September 7, 2016, OSMRE announced its final decision
with respect to WildEarth Guardians’ Petition for Rulemaking:
“The Director has decided to grant the petition, although we do
not intend to propose the specific rule changes requested in the
petition.” 126 Instead, OSMRE intends to initiate a notice-andcomment rulemaking period to determine the ultimate extent
and language of the rule changes. OSMRE admits that “the coal
market is dramatically different from when our current selfbonding regulations were drafted” and to “ensure the completion
of the reclamation plan as required” under SMCRA, changes
need to be made.127 The final decision lists several types of
changes that may be considered, including revisions to statutory
definitions, financial tests, and bonding requirements, as well as
the possibility of developing a systematic review process with
third-party review to periodically ascertain the true nature of
mining companies’ financial health. 128 Some of these changes
should be combined with those in the following subsections to
produce an effective solution.
1. Consultation with State Agencies
Before any changes are made, OSMRE should consult with
state agencies to determine what changes they would prefer. As
discussed in Part II.D.1., SMCRA sets up a federalism scheme
that places state agencies at the forefront of regulating mine operations.129 These agencies wield strong lobbying power, particularly with the new presidential administration.130 Most of the
126. Decision on Petition for Rulemaking, supra note 92, at 61,612.
127. Id. at 61,614.
128. Id.
129. Supra Part II.B.1.
130. See Why Coal Mines Close, W. VALUES PROJECT (June 27, 2016), http://
www.westernvaluesproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/6-27-16-WVP-Why
-Coal-Mines-Close.pdf (“Over the past decade, [five of the United States’ major
coal companies] funneled $100 million to DC lobbyists and politicians to protect
the coal industry’s $167 million annual federal taxpayer subsidies.”); cf. For
NMA, a New Administration and a New Congress Means a New Beginning,
NAT’L MINING ASS’N (Nov. 9, 2016), http://www.nma.org/2016/11/09/for-nma-a
-new-administration-and-a-new-congress-means-a-new-beginning; Statement
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comments opposing WildEarth Guardians’ Petition for Rulemaking place emphasis on the deference typically shown to state
agency decisions. 131 By consulting with state agencies first, OSMRE will demonstrate a diplomatic willingness to keep political
peace and maintain its credibility with the Trump Administration. OSMRE has already begun to take steps in this direction
by stating at the end of its Decision on Petition for Rulemaking,
“The state [regulatory agencies] have many years of experience
with self-bonding and we will ask that they provide specific suggestions on how to improve our regulations to ensure they have
adequate financial assurance to complete reclamation of each
mine.” 132 Additionally, the Interstate Mining Compact Commission (IMCC), a multistate governmental organization, has been
working with OSMRE’s Financial Assurance Coordination Team
(FACT) since 2015 to address concerns about key elements of
reclamation bonds, including self-bonds. 133 Following through on
its inclination to cooperate, negotiate, and consult with state
agencies can only help OSMRE find a suitable outcome.
2. Rejecting Illegal Rule Changes
If OSMRE follows through with a federal rulemaking, comments from the 2016 Petition for Rulemaking should be considered. The most obvious input that should be incorporated comes
from opponents who pointed out the illegality of discriminating
against bankrupt companies. 134 Unless Congress amends the
U.S. Bankruptcy Code, which is not a proportionate or practical
response to this narrow problem in the coal industry, there cannot be a rule which allows OSMRE to “deny, revoke, suspend, or
refuse to renew a . . . permit” on the basis of a company’s past or
from Peabody Energy on U.S. Presidential Election, PEABODY ENERGY (Nov. 9,
2016), http://www.peabodyenergy.com/content/120/press-releases (“With a new
Administration comes a new day to find common ground in achieving shared
policy goals.”).
131. See, e.g., Edison Elec. Inst., supra note 97 (“ The proposed amendments
. . . would deprive states of the discretion to consider self-bonding on a case-bycase basis, consistent with the financial requirements already set forth in the
existing regulations.”); Tri-State Generation & Transmission Ass’n, supra note
97, at 2 (“OSMRE should retain the current rules at 30 CFR Part 800 that provide Regulatory Authorities the latitude to design and implement a regulatory
program for their jurisdiction.”).
132. Decision on Petition for Rulemaking, supra note 92, at 61,615.
133. Gregory E. Conrad, State Regulatory Perspective re Mine Reclamation
Bonding, paper submitted as part of IEEFA Energy Finance Training conference (Mar. 14, 2017) (on file with author).
134. Decision on Petition for Rulemaking, supra note 92, at 61,614.
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current bankruptcy status. 135 Therefore, Petitioners’ suggested
changes to 30 C.F.R. § 800.23(b) are not lawful.136 However, the
next Subsection describes a suggested rule change that would be
beneficial.
3. Amending Rules To Improve Financial Health
Requirements and Review
Petitioners’ proposal to broaden and strengthen financial
solvency review would legally enable limitations on permitting
before bankruptcy is declared. In its Decision on Petition for
Rulemaking, OSMRE acknowledges that “the current regulations do not require use of the most appropriate financial tests,
both before a self-bond is approved and during the life of a selfbond.” 137 Petitioners’ suggest that financial regulations include
assessments of companies up the corporate ladder, including ultimate parent corporations, the company at the very top of a particular corporate structure. 138 They propose this be written into
OSMRE’s rules as a new definition—ultimate parent corporations—in 30 C.F.R. § 800.23(a). This definition would then be incorporated into any provision that discusses the need for the regulatory authority to assess financial status of companies
associated with a self-bond applicant. Such a requirement may
have been helpful in the case of Arch Coal, for example, when
that ultimate parent company declared bankruptcy, though its
subsidiary, Thunder Basin Coal Company, technically still qualified for self-bonding guaranteed by another subsidiary, Arch
Western Resources. 139 Petitioners’ proposed expansion of financial review procedures to ultimate parent corporations should be
a strong contender for inclusion in the final rule change.
Another way of approaching financial review change is by
amending 30 C.F.R. § 800.23(f), or (g), or both. Paragraph (f) allows a regulatory authority to require self-bonded applicants,
and parent and non-parent corporate guarantors, to submit an
update of the required financial information within ninety days
after the end of each fiscal year following the issuance of the selfbond or corporate guarantee. 140 Paragraph (g) requires that, if
at any time during the period when a self-bond is posted, the
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.

11 U.S.C. § 525(a) (2012).
See Petition for Rulemaking, supra note 71, at 8–9.
Decision on Petition for Rulemaking, supra note 92, at 61,613.
Petition for Rulemaking, supra note 71, at 8.
Id. at 5.
30 C.F.R. § 800.23(f ) (2017).
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financial conditions of the applicant or parent or non-parent corporate guarantor change so that the financial criteria are not
satisfied, the permittee must notify the regulatory authority
and, within ninety days, post an alternate form of bond in the
same amount as the self-bond. 141 The problem, as acknowledged
by OSMRE, is that financial conditions of a company can change
very quickly, and enforcement of these provisions is difficult. 142
Yearly check-ins on financial health are not enough in this volatile time of slowing coal demand. And if a company forgets or
chooses not to comply with the ninety-day-notice rule in paragraph (g), perhaps hoping that the situation will improve soon,
a state regulatory authority may not find out about the economic
setbacks before the self-bonded entity or its parent company declares bankruptcy. In its decision to grant the Petition for Rulemaking, OSMRE mentioned that it will explore ways in which to
“clarify the penalties for an entity’s failure to disclose a change
in financial status.” 143 However, if a company is going bankrupt,
it is unlikely that a financial penalty would be effective in motivating disclosure. Instead, OSMRE should amend these provisions to put the burden on the regulatory authority to more frequently check up on the financial status of the self-bonded entity
and its associated companies. Paragraph (f) could be amended to
increase the frequency with which the regulatory authority must
obtain financial updates. Or a new provision could be added
about regular financial review, either by the regulatory authority or by an independent third party, to motivate companies to
comply with paragraph (g) or risk being discovered and penalized for noncompliance. Increasing the frequency of checkups
would help avoid the possibility of a regulatory authority missing changed financial circumstances. Furthermore, it would put
the burden on state agencies to modify their regulatory regimes
in such a way that maintains the federal-state cooperative power
scheme; states would get to control the regulations, but subject
to a slightly altered federal mandatory minimum set of rules.
These rule changes are recommended because they are workable
and strike a compromise. The changes would appease environmental groups and taxpayers concerned with lax financial re141. Id. § 800.23(g).
142. See, e.g., Decision on Petition for Rulemaking, supra note 92, at 61,614
(“In other instances, the financial information came too late or too slowly for
[regulatory authorities] to take enforcement action before the company declared
bankruptcy.”).
143. Id.
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view, and ease the tension between federal and state government, while still allowing solvent mining companies to self-bond.
OSMRE itself brought up the possibility of a controversial
and important rule change unmentioned by Petitioners but
likely to attract opposition from industry—mandatory diversification of financial assurances.144 OSMRE explained, “Relying on
just one type of financial assurance, such as self-bond or a surety
bond from just one company, could be risky in an uncertain financial market.” 145 In other words, OSMRE may consider requiring mining companies to provide a variety of reclamation
bonds. This is a good idea, because coal companies will be immediately prepared to cover reclamation costs should bankruptcy
occur. Mandatory diversification is already a requirement in
some states once coal companies can no longer meet financial requirements for self-bonding, and it is the outcome of several recent bankruptcy proceedings.146 It makes sense for the federal
regulations to implement this requirement at the outset, before
any bankruptcy declaration. Yet, this proposed change will probably garner controversy, given the prevalence and convenience
of self-bonds for mining companies.147 Mandatory diversification
means that companies would have to sacrifice valuable assets or
money up front, a risky move during a time when demand for
coal is decreasing. This rule change would not eliminate selfbonding completely, but would make the practice less dominant
in the industry.
Of course, if a company is no longer allowed to purely selfbond, it will need to put up sufficient collateral to cover all reclamation obligations. OSMRE has admitted that the current regulations allow a small set of assets to be used as collateral for
multiple liabilities.148 This could potentially pose a big problem
for companies that may be imminently facing the need to cover
each of multiple liabilities. If the total amount of liabilities in the
long term exceeds the value of assets used as collateral, reclamation obligations will not be met. 149 OSMRE mentioned that it will
consider ways to address this problem, including a requirement
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. See infra notes 154–59 and accompanying text.
147. See supra notes 13 and 27.
148. See 30 C.F.R. § 800.21 (2017) for the OSMRE regulations governing collateral bonds; see also Decision on Petition for Rulemaking, supra note 92, at
61,614 (“Under our current regulations, the same small set of assets has been
used as collateral for multiple liabilities.”).
149. Decision on Petition for Rulemaking, supra note 92, at 61,614.
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that “a percentage of all bonds be supported by collateral not
subject to any other lien nor used as collateral for any other mine
or other liability.” 150 Such a rule change is vital in order to give
other rule changes any weight. If OSMRE eliminates or severely
limits the practice of self-bonding and mandates diversification
of financial assurances, those changes would be meaningless
without a provision that requires separate collateral for separate
liabilities. This requirement would need to be written into the
rules as a new provision, probably in the section regarding collateral bonds.
B. EFFORTS AT THE STATE AGENCY LEVEL SHOULD CONTINUE
TO ADDRESS SELF-BONDING
Though states with exclusive authority over their mining
programs responded negatively to the Petition for Rulemaking,
they are taking steps on their own to address the problem of selfbonding. Greg Conrad, Executive Director of the IMCC, wrote a
paper for a presentation on March 14, 2017, at the Institute for
Energy Economics and Financial Analysis (IEEFA) in which he
stated:
[O]ne of the states’ primary objectives with regard to the recent downturn in the coal industry and concomitant bankruptcy filings has been
to insure [sic] that reclamation continues at the affected mines so that
their taxpayers are not potentially saddled with the costs of reclaiming
active mines . . . . Companies that no longer met financial criteria were
ordered to replace their self-bonds and, in the interim, were required
to continue reclamation operations unabated. To date, reclamation has
continued and self-bonds have been replaced or are in the process of
being replaced. 151

On the reclamation side, Conrad’s statements are supported by
Wyoming Department of Environmental Quality (DEQ) data,
which appears to show that Arch Coal, Alpha Natural Resources,
nor Peabody Coal have yet to interrupt their continuing reclamation efforts (at least in Wyoming), despite recent and ongoing
bankruptcy proceedings.152 For example, 2491.9 acres of Arch
Coal’s Black Thunder Mine were released from Phase I reclamation, 2441.3 acres released from Phase II, and 787.1 acres released from Phase III during the months that Arch Coal underwent bankruptcy proceedings.153
150. Id.
151. Conrad, supra note 133, at 9.
152. E-mail from Carol Bilbrough, supra note 16.
153. Id. To name a few more, Alpha’s Belle Ayr mine released 539.6 acres
from Phase I reclamation and 510.4 acres from Phase II while Alpha was still
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On the bankruptcy side, there has been a pattern of coal
companies emerging from bankruptcy and, at least temporarily,
shedding their self-bond liabilities. In July 2016, after long negotiations between the parties in the bankruptcy proceedings,
Alpha Natural Resources reached a deal that prohibited future
self-bonding. 154 In October 2016, Arch Coal emerged from bankruptcy and promised to replace its $411 million in self-bonds
with traditional insurance to ensure reclamation truly happens
at its Wyoming sites. 155 In March 2017, Peabody Coal announced
its intention to temporarily replace self-bonding in Indiana, Illinois, New Mexico, and Wyoming with $1.26 billion in third-party
surety bonds, and $14.5 million from a state bond pool by the
time it emerged from bankruptcy in April of 2017. 156 These efforts show that companies have been willing to hold themselves
accountable for reclamation even when self-bonds are no longer
a viable option. However, reliance on companies to take responsibility is not enough to ensure that reclamation eventually happens, especially once the political spotlight is removed.
Some states have similarly started shifting away from accepting self-bonds over the last few years.157 Virginia stopped allowing self-bonds on June 30, 2014, when the state’s advisory
committee recommended no additional self-bonds be accepted. 158
in bankruptcy, and Peabody’s Shoshone #1 mine qualified as fully reclaimed.
Id. For an explanation of the reclamation phases, see supra note 16.
154. Benjamin Storrow, Bankruptcy Court Approves Alpha Natural Resources Bankruptcy Plan, Ends Self-Bonding, CASPER STAR TRIB. (July 7, 2016),
http://www.trib.com/business/energy/bankruptcy-court-approves-alpha-natural
-resources-bankruptcy-plan-ends-self/article_9381b194-72bf-5248-b7bf
-56f96f1c0ad1.html.
155. Heather Richards, After Bankruptcy, Arch Coal Will Put Up Cash To
Guarantee Mine Cleanup, CASPER STAR TRIB. (Sept. 13, 2016), http://www.trib
.com/business/after-bankruptcy-arch-coal-will-put-up-cash-to-guarantee/
article_502daaac-f1b1-5aaa-9315-ee0e196a640e.html.
156. Heather Richards, Peabody To End Self-Bonds, For Now, CASPER STAR
TRIB. (Mar. 8, 2017), http://www.trib.com/business/energy/peabody-to-end-self
-bonds-for-now/article_97b7d420-fd13-559f-ae53-54fa47ab0a0f.html; see also
Bryce Gray, Peabody Emerges from Bankruptcy; Stock Trading Resumes Tuesday, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (Apr. 4, 2017), http://www.stltoday.com/
business/local/peabody-emerges-from-bankruptcy-stock-trading-resumes
-tuesday/article_4c379139-da5c-56a0-8c29-bafadb206ce9.html.
157. But cf. Tripp Baltz et al., No Collateral Needed for Cleanup in Some
States Despite Mine Bankruptcies, BLOOMBERG BNA (Mar. 30, 2017), https://
www.bna.com/no-collateral-needed-n57982085962 (describing how numerous
states like Arkansas, Wyoming, and Pennsylvania, are continuing to accept selfbonded permits).
158. Petition for Rulemaking, supra note 71, at Exhibit 8, Self-Bonding Survey.
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Also in 2014, a subsidiary of Luminant Mining was required by
the state of Texas to replace $1.01 billion in self-bonds with cash
bonds.159 As of January 2016, Colorado decided to “mov[e] away
from self-bonding.” 160 On November 7, 2017, the State of Wyoming announced the imminent proposal of state regulations to
limit self-bonding and strengthen financial review of mining
companies that do not qualify to self-bond. 161 It is unclear
whether this trend is purely a result of states reacting to a
changing energy market, or whether public outcry has influenced states’ decisions. Either way, states have properly taken
the lead in addressing problems with self-bonding. States must
continue to take a strict stance when mining companies can no
longer meet the financial requirements of self-bonds, as they
have been tasked with regulatory and enforcement authority under SMCRA and therefore owe a duty to their citizens to perform
this task.
C. EFFORTS AT THE LEGISLATIVE LEVEL MAY BE USED AS A
RECOURSE
This Note has focused on the 2016 Petition for Rulemaking
and solutions that could be reached through that process. It is
worth pointing out that the federal notice-and-comment rulemaking process can take a long time,162 especially during a presidential administration that does not want to penalize the coal
159. Storrow, Concerned About Self-Bonding, supra note 22.
160. Leigh Paterson, CO “Moves Away” from Self-Bonding, INSIDE ENERGY
(Jan. 5, 2016), http://www.insideenergy.org/2016/01/05/co-moves-away-from
-self-bonding (quoting Todd Hartman, Communications Director at the Colorado DNR). Colorado managed to get Peabody Energy to provide replacement
bonding for twenty-seven million dollars in cleanup costs in April 2016, which
led to the Director of OSMRE, Joe Pizarchik, to publicly question whether “collusion” or “malfeasance” was involved in states like Wyoming where self-bonding continued to be accepted. Storrow, Concerned About Self-Bonding, supra
note 22.
161. Heather Richards, Wyoming Proposes Stronger Rules for Ensuring
Clean Up from Coal Operations, CASPER STAR TRIB. (Nov. 7, 2017), http://www
.trib.com/business/energy/wyoming-proposes-stronger-rules-for-ensuring-clean
-up-from-coal/article_0dadf9b3-8931-5a8d-8fb5-c06108869c29.html. The draft
regulations will be presented to the state’s Land Quality Advisory board on December 6, 2017, and then opened to the public for comment. Id.
162. OMB WATCH REGULATORY RESEARCH CTR., BACKGROUND ON THE
RULEMAKING PROCESS 3, https://www.foreffectivegov.org/sites/default/files/
regs/rcenter/backgroundpdfs/IV.Rulemaking.pdf (“ The time it takes from initial
drafts of a regulation to publication as a final rule can range from a few months
to several years. Most often, it takes a few years . . . because of the complexity
of the issues, the collection of appropriate information, and the inherent delays
built into the regulatory process.”).
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industry. 163 For interested parties like Petitioners, who seek a
national change in self-bonding policy, they may want to circumvent OSMRE entirely. 164 This would be a possible route if the
federal rulemaking does not happen, or if the rulemaking produces an unsatisfactory result that does not make enough
changes to strengthen financial review. Granted, it would be
best to wait for a sympathetic Congress before seriously advancing any legislation, and that may take just as long as a federal
rulemaking. However, there is already one bill proposed in Congress that could provide the Petitioners’ desired result.
The Coal Clean Up Taxpayer Protection Act would address
the issue of ensuring reclamation on a national scale without involving OSMRE. 165 Senator Maria Cantwell (D-Wash.), ranking
member of the Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee, spearheaded the Congressional anti-self-bonding campaign
throughout 2016. 166 In February 2016, she questioned then-Interior Secretary Sally Jewell about the dangers of self-bonding
by coal companies during testimony regarding the Interior Department’s budget request for the fiscal year of 2017. 167 In March
2016, Senator Cantwell and Senator Dick Durbin (D-Ill.) submitted a request to the Government Accountability Office to investigate self-bonding by coal companies. 168 Senator Cantwell also
followed up on her questioning of Secretary Jewell by sending a
letter asking for a plan to protect taxpayers and end self-bonding. 169 In June 2016, Senator Cantwell introduced the Coal
163. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
164. Cf. Baltz et al., supra note 157 (quoting a spokesman for the Indiana
Department of Natural Resources as saying: “Self-bonding is not a policy. It’s
law—both state and federal. Any change would have to come from one of those
legislative bodies.”).
165. S. 3066, 114th Cong. (2016).
166. See Energy, MARIA CANTWELL: U.S. SEN. FOR WASH., https://www.cantwell.senate.gov/issues/energy (last visited Jan. 31, 2018) (giving a brief description of the Senator ’s efforts in this area).
167. Cantwell Questions Secretary Jewell on the Dangers of Self-Bonding by
Coal Companies, U.S. S. COMM. ON ENERGY & NAT. RES. (Feb. 23, 2016), http://
www.energy.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/democratic-news?ID=92D91C29
-5E05-40CA-B2D3-6AC6BCE17992.
168. Cantwell, Durbin to GAO: Investigate Self-Bonding by Coal Companies,
U.S. SENATE COMMITTEE ON ENERGY & NAT. RES. (Mar. 8, 2016), http://www
.energy.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/democratic-news?ID=F2BA9FD5-A60A
-4575-AF22-C5C6E60119FF.
169. Cantwell Asks Interior Secretary Jewell for Plan To Protect Taxpayers
and End Self-Bonding for Coal Mining Reclamation, U.S. SENATE COMMITTEE
ON ENERGY & NAT. RES. (Mar. 10, 2016), http://www.energy.senate.gov/public/
index.cfm/2016/3/cantwell-asks-interior-secretary-jewell-for-plan-to-protect
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Clean Up Taxpayer Protection Act, which would amend SMCRA
to disallow future self-bonding and require current self-bonds to
be converted to surety or collateral bonds.170 When the Act did
not pass, the senator reintroduced it in 2017. 171 Since Senator
Cantwell proposes an even more extreme solution to self-bonding—ending the practice entirely—it is unlikely to acquire bipartisan support in Congress. If someone proposed a bill that included more compromising positions, like those recommended in
Parts III.A and B, it may receive more support. This type of legislative campaign is an example of a viable option that not only
brings attention and momentum to the issue now, but could
serve as an alternative means to the end, in the event that the
federal rulemaking never happens or produces an unsatisfactory
result.
CONCLUSION
This Note describes how the market trend is shifting away
from coal in the long term, causing numerous recent coal mining
companies to go bankrupt and making future bankruptcies plausible. Even though coal may never see the same production or
consumption levels in the United States again, it cannot be
phased out of the national economy immediately or easily. Coal
will likely retain a central role in the U.S. energy economy for at
least another decade. 172 Therefore, it is necessary to address the
problem of self-bonded mine companies before taxpayers are
-taxpayers-and-end-self-bonding-for-coal-mining-reclamation.
170. Coal Cleanup Taxpayer Protection Act, S. 3066, 114th Cong. (2016)
(read twice and referred to the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources,
June 6, 2016), https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/senate-bill/3066.
171. Coal Cleanup Taxpayer Protection Act, S. 800, 115th Cong. (2017) (read
twice and referred to the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, Mar.
30, 2017), https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/senate-bill/800.
172. Even in states that have committed to phase out coal-fired power
plants, the goal date is decades in the future. See, e.g., Mike Hughlett, State
Regulators Approve Xcel’s Plan To Shut Down Becker Coal-Fired Plants, STAR
TRIB. (Oct. 13, 2016), http://www.startribune.com/state-regulators-approve-xcel
-s-plan-to-shut-down-becker-coal-fired-plants/397030671 (explaining that the
coal-fired generators in Becker, Minnesota, will be shut down by 2026); Oregon
Becomes First State in Nation To Sign Bill That Phases Out Coal, Ramps Up
Renewables, ECOWATCH (Mar. 14, 2016), http://www.ecowatch.com/oregon
-becomes-first-state-in-nation-to-sign-bill-that-phases-out-coal-1882189350
.html (“[The law] will eradicate the use of coal for electricity generation entirely
within two decades.”); TVA Has Agreed To Phase Out Older Coal-Fired Plants
by the Year 2020—and Phase in Cleaner, Greener Forms of Energy, TENN. VALLEY AUTH., https://www.tva.gov/Environment/Environmental-Stewardship/
Air-Quality/Clean-Air-Act-Agreement (last visited Jan. 31, 2018).
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forced to take on the burden of reclamation. This Note argues
that the federal agency in charge of coal mining, OSMRE, should
change the language of existing regulations to strengthen financial review and require diversification of financial assurances.
This Note also encourages OSMRE to work closely with state
agencies moving forward, as states have the primary enforcement role under SMCRA and the most experience working with
coal mine companies, including on the issue of self-bonding.
Whether or not the rulemaking will proceed in the near future
remains to be seen. If the rulemaking does not occur or does not
correct the problems identified with self-bonding, Petitioners
should consider the (admittedly difficult) path towards amending regulations through legislative efforts. For the sake of the
land, the local communities, and the taxpayers, self-bonding reclamation practices need to change.

